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Firebird Foundation IbPhoenix 2016



- History of a feature
 - Existed (but closed with #ifdef) since IB 6.01.
 - No support for initial database encryption
 - Crypt key expected to be passed from client in DPB
 - Implemented from scratch in FB 3
 - SQL support for database encryption / decryption
 - Encryption on the fly using background server thread
 - Flexible crypt keys control including separate KeyHolder plugin

- When NOT use:
 - Protect database file from being copied over network
- Correct solution
 - Tune access rights in your network

- Share \\server\c with full control
- Everyone Administrator or same access rights
- Windows trusted authentication, mapping Domain Admins => SYSDBA (FB 2.1)
 - Everyone SYSDBA?

- When NOT use:
 - Let only some users attach to specific database
- Correct solution
 - Use multiple security databases

Pre-FB3 (Encrypt?)



- When is it useful?
- Protecting databases distributed for fee
 - Filled with important data
 - With important business logic in metadata
- Protecting databases from being physically stolen (HDD or the entire server)

- Compared with use of encrypted disk
 - Useless when distributing databases
 - Requires offline period to copy database to encrypted disk
- What do we crypt
 - Data, blob and index pages (except header)
 - Subsidiary pages (PIP, TIP, etc.) left not encrypted
 - Key correctness is checked using hash providing zero-knowledge about a key
 - Sensitive data (hash, encryption flags, etc.) are protected by additional encrypted checksum

When are pages encrypted / decrypted?



- How crypt key can be stored?
- Databases distributed for fee
 - In special client software
 - Database should be accessible only from that software
 - Support "developers mode"
- Databases protected from physical loss
 - In some secret place (host in security department)
 - Database should be accessible from any client, including generic purpose tools

How to store key?



Possible key sources



Possible key sources





Possible key sources

Key transfer

Faked database crypt plugin

Dump

a key

Key holder plugin



- Approximate authorization protocol
 - Crypt plugin => Key holder:
 - Send me a key
 - Key holder:
 - Encrypts a key
 - Key holder => Crypt plugin:
 - Encrypted key
 - Crypt plugin:
 - Decrypts a key
 - Ready to work

Possible key sources

Crypt key transmission protocol

Database crypt plugin secret place

Key from secret place

public key Key holder plugin







- Step 1 select plugin to use
 - Not open source problems with crypt keys
 - Write it yourself
 - Use trusted third party plugin
- Step 2 install and check on database copy
 - Use SQL statement:

Alter database encrypt with "PluginName"

- Or:

Alter database encrypt with "PluginName" key "Name"

Meaning of key name is plugin-dependent

- Step 3 backup !!!
- Step 4 choose off-peak load period and encrypt database
 - Do not backup database during encryption!
 - Use monitoring tables or gstat (may be in services API) to monitor encryption progress

SQL: Select MON\$CRYPT_PAGE * 100.0 / MON\$PAGES as Percent from mon\$database

gstat -e db_name

- Working with encrypted database
 - API fully functional
 - Utilities fully functional except gstat
 - Limited gstat functionality only -e / -h switches
 - Backup database
 - gbak: encrypt copy (file.gbak) manually
 - nbackup: needs full (level 0) copy after encryption

Known issue

- Encrypted size == initial size
- Use of ECB mode in AES
- Visible repeating sequences on some pages

- Possible solutions
 - Use other cipher (RC4)
 - Reserve space on pages for IV at database creation time



Performance



- Performance (desktop)
 - 8 CPU cores (AMD FX-8120)
 - RAM 8 Gb
 - Slow SATA
 - 4 connections, 1 minute (TPCC)
 - AES, using OpenSSL
 - Default cache (16 Mb < DB size)

(tpmC, TPC-C Throughput)

Forced writes	Not encrypted	Encrypted	Performance loss
On	984	740	25%
Off	27062	18453	32%

- Performance (desktop)
 - 8 CPU cores (AMD FX-8120)
 - RAM 8 Gb
 - Slow SATA
 - 4 connections, 1 minute (TPCC)
 - AES, using OpenSSL
 - Default cache (320 Mb > DB size)

(tpmC, TPC-C Throughput)

Forced writes	Not encrypted	Encrypted	Performance loss
On	1036	882	15%
Off	27793	19170	31%

- Performance (dedicated server)
 - 24 (12 with HT) CPU cores
 - RAM 32 Gb
 - SSD
 - 100 connections, 90 minute
 - AES, using OpenSSL
 - DefaultDbCachePages = 768K (6Gb > DB size) (operations / minute)

Forced writes	Not encrypted	Encrypted	Performance loss
On	4491	4152	8%
Off	4346	4183	4%

Performance – sequential vs. index scan

Sequential scan

Header

Decrypted data All pages are used Index

scaleader

Decrypted data

Single record is used

Decrypted data

- Initial encryption performance (desktop)
 - 8 CPU cores (AMD FX-8120)
 - RAM 8 Gb
 - Slow SATA
 - AES, using OpenSSL
 - Default cache (16 Mb < DB size)
 - Dedicated use of database

Pages (8k) / second

Forced writes	Encryption	
On	3964	
Off	6378	

Thanks for your attention!

